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It is often assumed that decisionmaking involves neural competition, accumulation of evidence “scores” over time, and commitment to
a particular alternative once its scores reach a critical decision threshold first. So far, however, neither the first-to-threshold rule nor the
nature of competition (feedforward or feedback inhibition) has been revealed by experiments. Here, we presented two simultaneously
flashed targets that reversed their intensity difference during each presentation and instructed human subjects tomake a saccade toward
the brightest target. All subjects preferentially chose the target that was brightest during the first stimulus phase. Unless this first phase
lasted only 40 ms, this primacy effect persisted even if the second, reversed-intensity phase lasted longer. This effect did not result from
premature commitment to the initially dominant target, because a strong target imbalance in the opposite direction later drove nearly all
responses toward that location. Moreover, there was a nonmonotonic relation between target imbalance and primacy: increasing the
target imbalance beyond 40 cd/m2 caused an attenuation of primacy. These are the hallmarks of hysteresis, predicted bymodels inwhich
target representations compete through strong feedback. Reaction times were independent of the choice probability. This dissociation
suggests that target selection and movement initiation are distinct phenomena.
Introduction
To explain how saccadic responses compete for selection and
execution, current decision-making theories assume that sensory
evidence is noisy and that it is accumulated over time to reach a
decision bound (Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008). Different types of
models make different assumptions about how evidence is com-
bined (Smith and Ratcliff, 2004): “evidence scores” for two or
more alternatives can accumulate independently (Cousineau,
2004), compete with feedforward inhibitory interaction (Lam-
ing, 1966; Link and Heath, 1975; Nosofsky and Palmeri, 1997;
Palmeri, 1997), or compete via feedback inhibition (Usher and
McClelland, 2001;Wang, 2002;Wong andWang, 2006). So far, it
has been impossible to single out one among the many types of
visual decision-making models; despite different architectures,
they predict similarly optimal choice behavior in static two-
alternative forced choice tasks (model mimicry; van Zandt and
Ratcliff, 1995; Bogacz et al., 2006).
To distinguish between feedforward and feedback cross-
inhibition, we introduced a newmanipulation: we studied sacca-
dic choices between pairs of briefly flashed targets the intensities
of which were swapped during presentation (Fig. 1A,B). Under
such conditions, circuits with feedback competition that exceed a
certain critical strength are sensitive to the initial stimulus bias
but relatively resistant to the later bias reversal. This characteristic
behavior (hysteresis) occurs because the initial “winner” main-
tains its advantage by recurrent inhibition of its competitor
(Noest et al., 2007; Furman andWang, 2008). These models thus
predict that subjects typically choose the target with the highest
initial strength provided that the initial differences outlast the
time constant of the feedback creating the hysteresis and the stim-
uli are not strong enough to overcome this hysteresis (Fig. 1C). In
contrast, feedforward integration models predict that for bal-
anced durations of the two stimulus epochs, early and late biases
are equally effective (because the total evidence for both targets is
the same), whereas leaky-integrator models even predict that
later biases dominate the final evidence scores. This implies that
subjects should either show no preference at all or show a prefer-
ence for the target that is strongest at the end, unless theymake an
irreversible choice for the initially strongest target before the stim-
ulus ends (premature choice commitment). Indeed, all accumu-
lator models can produce primacy (i.e., a choice preference for
the initially strongest target) if they include some thresholding
mechanism that induce choice commitment.Weprobed the con-
tribution of such thresholding mechanisms by appending strong
intensity biases toward the initially weakest target.
We found robust preferences for the initially strongest target,
which reversed only if the first stimulus epoch was sufficiently
short and the second epoch outlasted the first one by a sufficient
amount. The basic primacy effect was attenuated at larger stim-
ulus biases and could even be inverted completely if the stimuli
were immediately followed by a strong intensity bias toward the
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initially weakest target. This near-complete transition from pri-
macy to recency shows that the observed primacy cannot be at-
tributed to premature commitment to the initially strongest
target. Simulations showed that all these results were best de-
scribed by a feedback cross-inhibition model. Reaction times
were independent of the changes in choice probability and in-
stead depended on the initial intensity of the selected target.
Materials andMethods
Subjects
Ten adult human subjects (5 male, 5 female) participated in the experi-
ments. All had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Subjects
were informed about the experimental procedures and gave informed
consent before the start of the experiments. Procedureswere approved by
theRadboudUniversityMedical Centre. Subjects J.R., V.G., J.G., and J.K.
were experimenters; all other subjects were kept unaware of the aim of
the study.
Setup
Subjects were seated in a darkened room at 80 cm of a projection screen
on which stimuli were back projected. In the first three experiments, an
LCD projector (model DLA-S10E; JVC, ) with a refresh rate of 75Hz and
a maximum luminance level of45 cd/m2 was used. To present targets
at higher contrast and luminance levels in Experiment 4, we used a digital
light processing projector with a maximum luminance level of 300
cd/m2 and a refresh rate of 60 Hz (P1265 model DNX0702; Acer). Lu-
minance levels were measured with a luminance meter (model LS-100;
Minolta).
A chinrest was used to minimize head movements. Eye movements
were measured with the scleral search coil technique (Remmel Labora-
tories). Coils were inserted after one drop of topical anesthetic (oxybu-
procaine hydochloride 0.4%; Thea Pharma). Once the coil was in place, a
drop of artificial tear (methylcellulose 0.5%; Thea Pharma) and a ban-
dage lens (a large contact lens with a strength of zero diopters) were
applied to minimize ocular discomfort. Use of the bandage lens doubled
the measuring time with the coil to 1 h per session (Sprenger et al.,
2008). Eye position signals were low-pass filtered, amplified, and sam-
pled at 500 Hz per channel. The spatial resolution of the horizontal
and vertical eye position signals was better than 0.1° (root mean
square measure).
Paradigms
In the first three experiments, each trial consisted of four epochs (Fig. 1).
At the beginning of each trial, a fixation ring with diameter of 0.5° was
presented at the center of the screen. Then, after a random period of
400–1200 ms, the fixation ring disappeared and two filled, circular tar-
gets with a diameter of 0.5° were presented simultaneously at 10° to the
left and right of the center. After a variable delay (D1) of 40, 80, or 120ms,
this first set of targets was replaced by a second set of targets at the same
locations. In control trials, the intensity of both the left and right target
remained unaltered. In reversal trials, however, the intensities of the left
and right target were reversed compared with the first target epoch. In
both cases, targets were then displayed for another 40, 80, or 120ms (D2)
until the screen turned black. For each reversal condition, control stimuli
were presented with the same total duration (i.e., D1 D2).
Subjects were always instructed to first look at the fixation ring and
then make a saccade to the most intense target as quickly and accu-
rately as possible. They received no feedback about their perfor-
mance. Target intensities and durations of the first and second target
presentation epoch were manipulated systematically across trials and
experimental sessions.
Target intensities in Experiments 1–3 ranged from 4.5 to 36.6 cd/m2.
Background luminance was 0.273 cd/m2. The intensity difference (I )
between the left and the right target on any given trial could be large (4.5
vs 36.6 cd/m2), medium (7.8 vs 29.1 cd/m2), small (12.3 vs 22.4 cd/m2),
or zero (both targets 16.7 cd/m2). Thus, in control trials, target lumi-
nance could be unambiguous or ambiguous. In reversal trials, the mean
intensity of the left and right target was the same only when the durations
of the first and second epoch were the same. High-to-low and low-to-
high intensity changes were achieved with a time constant of 10 ms,
limiting the shortest practical presentation time to 40 ms.
Experiments 1–3 established the conditions under which primacy
arises, but could not discriminate between two very different mecha-
nisms that can generate primacy: hysteresis due to strong feedback com-
petition or premature commitment due to an absorbing bound (see
Introduction). Testing whether primacy can still be reverted does dis-
criminate between these differentmodel types. Primacy due to absorbing
bounds is by definition irreversible and should increase monotonically
with increasing I. Conversely, primacy due to hysteretic integration
dynamics should be reversible by a sufficiently strong stimulus. In Exper-
iment 4, we therefore presented reversal stimuli across an extended range
of target contrasts (i.e., from 22.5 vs 33.6 cd/m2 up to 1.5 vs 77.5 cd/m2).
The durationsD1 andD2 were kept fixed at 50 ms. Targets in the 100 ms
Figure 1. Intensity reversal paradigm andmodel predictions. A, In each trial, a central fixa-
tion ringwas presented for 400–1200ms. Upondisappearance of the fixation ring, twoperiph-
eral targets with different intensities (I ) appeared. After a delay of 40–120 ms (D1), the
intensities of the left and right target reversed (reversal trials) or remained unaltered (control
trials, data not shown). In either case, both targets remained present for another 40–120 ms
(D2) until they were extinguished simultaneously. Subjects were instructed to look at the fixa-
tion ring and make a saccade toward the most intense target as quickly and as accurately as
possible.B, Time traces illustrating the intensity changes of the right target (TR), the left target
(TL), and the fixation ring, as well as the ensuing saccade. Depicted traces show an initial
intensity bias toward the right target, followed by an equally strong bias toward the left target.
The intensity differences between the left and right target, the timing of the intensity reversals,
and the overall stimulus durations were systematically varied. In a modified version of this
paradigm, theD1 andD2 epochswere followedby a third epoch (D3) inwhich therewas a strong
intensity bias toward the initially weakest target. See Materials and Methods for details. C,
Response of competing decision units. Models with sufficiently strong feedback competition
predict a choice preference for targets with highest initial strength. Feedforward integration
models predict equal choice probabilities because the early and late biases are equally effective.
Feedforward models with leaky integration predict that later biases dominate, resulting in a
choice preference for targets with highest final strength. Premature commitment induced by
low decision thresholds (dashed horizontal lines) predicts primacy for any of these architec-
tures, but in such bounded accumulator models, primacy cannot be undone by later stimuli.
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ambiguous condition had an intensity of 27.8 cd/m2. Control stimuli
lasted 50 ms and target contrasts ranged from 7.2 versus 49.5 cd/m2 to
26.0 versus 29.7 cd/m2. Background luminance was 0.18 cd/m2.
To further probe the extent to which primacy can be undone by later
stimulus evidence, Experiment 4 also included two forced reversal condi-
tions in which the stimulus presentation ended with a bright pulse at the
location of the initially weakest target. More specifically, in the 50-50-67
ms forced reversal condition, a 50-50 ms reversal stimulus was immedi-
ately followed by a third, 67 ms epoch in which there was a strong bias
toward the initially weakest target. In the 83-67 ms forced reversal con-
dition, 83 ms of initial bias was immediately followed by 67 ms of re-
versed extreme bias. In both cases, the initial bias was 49.5 versus 7.2
cd/m2 and the final, reversed bias was 7.2 versus 283 cd/m2. For subjects
J.K. and J.G., we also tested forced reversal conditions with an initial bias
of 13.7 versus 40.0 cd/m2 and 3.6 versus 62.7 cd/m2, respectively, be-
cause those intensity differences better matched the intensity differences
that evoked the strongest primacy effect in the unforced condition. As in
Experiments 1–3, we kept the stimulus durations short to ensure that the
subjects would not consciously perceive the intensity manipulations.
Data were collected in blocks of 120–138 trials inwhich all experimen-
tal conditions were presented five or six times in pseudorandom order.
Subjects completed 10–12 blocks across different sessions until each
unique condition was tested 60 times (Experiments 1–3) or at least 100
times (Experiment 4). This typically required three or four sessions per
subject per experiment.
Data analysis
Saccades were detected on the basis of calibrated eye position signals with
custom software. Detection of saccade onsets and offsets was based on
velocity and acceleration criteria. All saccade markers were examined by
the experimenters and, if necessary, corrected. Further analysis was done
with MATLAB (version 7.9, MathWorks) using custom software.
To determine the subject’s choice regarding the most intense tar-
get, we only considered the direction of his/her first saccadic eye
movement after stimulus offset that exceeded the detection criteria of
0.5° amplitude and 30°/s velocity. Subsequent correction saccades in
the opposite direction were discarded. Such corrections occurred
only in 1.5% of trials with equal probability across all stimulus
conditions. Therefore, excluding trials in which corrections occurred
did not change any of our conclusions.
Psychometric response functions. A generalized linearmodel with a logit
link functionwas used to fit psychometric curves through the data points
from Experiments 1–3 using the following logistic equation:
PR 
1
1  eQ
with Q a  I b (1)
Where PR is the probability of a rightward saccade and I the intensity
difference (in cd/m2) between the right and the left target at stimulus
onset. Positive values ofI indicate that the (initial) intensity of the right
target is larger than that of the left target. The parameters a and b repre-
sent the subject’s sensitivity and bias, respectively. Student’s t tests were
used to test whether the fit parameters significantly differed from zero
and whether the slopes (a) of the psychometric curves differed between
experimental conditions.
The simple logistic model from Equation 1 was no longer adequate to
describe the nonmonotonic psychometric curves obtained in Experi-
ment 4. We therefore extended the model in the following way:
PR 
1
1  eQ
with Q d a  (I b) c  (I b)3 (2)
Note that Q is now a third-order polynomial where the additional pa-
rameter c represents the strength of the hysteresis reductions at higher
I’s (see Results). The parameters b and d capture the subject-specific
response biases. The horizontal shift b reflects an offset in the input to the
choice stage. The vertical shift d reflects some bias at the output of that
stage. Experiment 4 brings out the distinction between these two types of
biases. In Experiments 1–3, they are confounded into one net bias pa-
rameter (i.e., b in Equation 1) because the applied range of target con-
trasts appeared to be too small in these experiments.
Absorbing bounds inequality test. To quantify how strongly the data
from Experiment 4 challenge mechanisms that attribute our primacy
effects to premature commitment caused by absorbing bounds, we con-
sider the class of accumulatormodels that have absorbing bounds but no
hysteresis in their evidence accumulation. This whole class ofmodels can
then be tested by comparing the forced reversal conditions with their
unforced counterparts. Key in this analysis is the following notion: at the
end of D2 (which is either the end of the whole stimulus or the start of
forcing D3 phase) a fraction of the accumulated-evidence trajectories
already reached the boundary of the initially strongest target (unknown
fraction Ai) or the boundary for the other target (unknown fraction Af),
leaving only a limited fraction (1  Ai  Af) of formally “undecided”
trajectories that can still be influenced by a later forcing stimulus (Fig.
5A). If we knew for sure that the bright D3 forcing pulse were strong
enough to drive all “surviving” trajectories to (or closest to) the boundary
of the initially weakest target, the probability of still choosing the initially
strongest target in the forced reversal condition would provide a direct
measure ofAi. Unfortunately, we cannot be sure that the forcing stimulus
is indeed sufficiently strong to achieve this. We can, however, show that
the paired probabilities from the two experimental conditions must sat-
isfy an inequality that—if violated by our data—rejects this whole class of
bounded accumulator models:
Let Fi denote the probability of still choosing the initially strongest
target in the forced reversal condition. This observed probability then sets
the upper limit for the unknown fraction of trials, Ai, in which the
accumulated-evidence trajectories reached the absorbing bound of the
initially strongest target before the end of D2. Note that we can only
conclude that FiAi, because, as we noted above, we cannot be sure that
the D3 forcing stimulus is strong enough. However, from the time- and
polarity-antisymmetric nature of the reversal stimulus and from the ob-
served behavior in the (unforced) reversal condition, we can now derive
further constraints on Ai.
For simplicity, we first assume absence of response biases. This as-
sumption is eventually lifted, because it can be shown to only make our
test more conservative. Now let Ri denote the observed probability of
choosing the initially dominant target in the (unforced) reversal condi-
tion. Next, keep in mind that Ri is the sum of Ai and the probability that
an undecided trajectory ends up being closer to the bound of the initially
strongest target (Fig. 5A). Next, we know thatAiAf. This holds because
at the end of D1, the trajectories tend to be closer to the boundary of the
initially brightest target (as verified by the control condition). Therefore,
given that D2  D1 and given the same (but reversed) I, a drift to the
other boundary during D2 takes more time. This, in combination with
the assumed lack of hysteresis and bias in this model class, implies that at
most one half of the undecided trajectories can eventually contribute to
choosing the initially strongest target. That gives us the starting point for
some algebra which relates Ri to Fi:
Ri Ai
1
2
1 Ai Af
1
2
1 Ai Af
1
2
1 Fi (3)
or:
Fi  2Ri  1 (4)
Therefore, we can test whether the measured Ri and Fi combinations
violate this inequality.
The only remaining step required for the inequality test of Equation 4
is to account for the effect of choice biases that were clearly present in our
data. We can do this by averaging the “raw” Ri and Fi values plotted in
Figure 4 for the two mirror-symmetric stimulus conditions per subject.
This results in more bias-resistant measures of Ri and Fi:
Rˆi 
1
2
Ri
  1  Ri
 and Fˆi
1
2
Fi
  1 Fi
 (5)
Where the  and  superscripts refer to initial stimulus biases of I
andI, respectively. Using the modified Ri and Fi variables in this test
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not only reduces the effect of subject-dependent biases (which are diffi-
cult to estimate precisely), but the remaining “second-order” bias effects
only makes our test more conservative (at least in a wide regime of
practical interest, Fˆi  0.5, because of convexity properties of the psy-
chometric functions).
SEs for Rˆi and Fˆi were obtained from error-propagation rules:
SERˆi  Ri1  Ri4NR  Ri
1  Ri

4NR
 and
SE(Fˆ)i  Fi(1 Fi)4NF  Fi
(1 Fi
)
4NF
 (6)
Where the Ns denote the total numbers of trials per test condition, with
the subscripts R and F referring to the reversal conditions and forced
reversal conditions, respectively, and with the  and  superscripts
referring to the two different intensity biases as before. Using normal
approximation, we then tested the null hypothesis from Equation 4
against the alternative hypothesis (i.e., Fi  2 Ri  1) by applying the
following one-sided z test:
z 
2Rˆi  1  Fˆi
SE
with SE 4  SERˆi2 SEFˆi2 (7)
Chronometric response functions. Saccade latencies were also analyzed as a
function of I. For each subject, we first subtracted the average reaction
time measured in the ambiguous control condition pooled across right-
ward and leftward saccades. This was done because the average latency
relative to target onset differed greatly among subjects (range: 250–600
ms). The resulting chronometric response functions were quantified by
fitting linear regression lines to the data:
RT    I   (8)
One-way ANCOVA, with I as the predictor and RT (in ms) as the
response and condition as the grouping variable, was used to test for
differences between the chronometric curves. Correction for multiple
testing was achieved by using a Tukey–Kramer test for multiple
comparisons.
Results
Balanced durations
In the first experiment, two targets were presented simultane-
ously for 80 or 160 ms, and the initial intensity bias reversed
halfway during stimulus presentation (i.e., D1  D2  40 ms or
D1 D2 80 ms). In control trials, the intensities remained the
same across D1 and D2. Figure 2 shows the probability of right-
ward saccades as a function of the initial rightward intensity bias
(I, positive if the right target was brightest at stimulus onset). In
both control conditions (Fig. 2A,C), subjects discriminated tar-
get intensities easily; the psychometric curves had steep, positive
slopes and saccades were almost always directed toward the
brightest target at the largest intensity differences (I  	36
cd/m2). For purely ambiguous control stimuli (I  0 cd/m2),
choice probabilities scattered around 50%. The psychometric
curves obtained in the 80-80 ms reversal condition (Fig. 2B) also
had steep, positive slopes, indicating a significant preference for
the initially strongest target in all subjects (t test, p  0.0001).
Subjects even maintained a clear preference for the initially
brightest target in the 40-40 ms reversal condition (Fig. 2D;
slopes
 0; t test, p 0.001 for all subjects). Compared with the
control conditions, the slopes were somewhat reduced (80-80ms
condition: t test, p 0.05 for all subjects), or reduced consider-
ably (40-40 ms reversal condition: t test, p 0.01 for all subjects
except V.G.), indicating that target selection was not exclusively
based on the initial intensity differences; subsequent stimulus
information also had a significant influence on the eventual de-
cision, even though the changes in target luminance were not
consciously perceived.
Unbalanced durations
To probe further the contributions of initial and later stimulus
epochs, two additional experiments were performed in which
durationsD1 andD2 were manipulated. In Experiment 2, we first
kept the total stimulus duration fixed at D1 D2 160 ms and
swapped the targets’ intensities at D1  40, 80, or 120 ms after
stimulus onset. Choices in the control condition (Fig. 3A) and
80-80 ms reversal condition (Fig. 3C) replicated the primacy ef-
fects of Experiment 1 with more subjects. In the new 120-40 ms
reversal condition (Fig. 3B), that is, ifD1 lasted three times longer
than D2, choice behavior became almost undistinguishable from
the control condition in all subjects. In contrast, if D1 was three
times shorter than D2 in the 40-120 ms reversal condition, the
subjects’ choice behaviors diverged considerably (Fig. 3D). Three
subjects (I.B., A.M., and J.K.) still showed a significant, albeit
weaker primacy effect (slopes
0; t test, p 0.05), but the other
four subjects (J.R., V.G., D.B., and D.A.) now showed a signifi-
cant preference for the target that was most intense at the end
(slopes0; t test, p 0.01). However, even in these four subjects,
the choice probabilities were not completely inverted compared
with the 120-40 ms condition. To summarize these changes, Fig-
ure 3E shows the averaged slopes of the psychometric curves as a
function ofDD1D2. Note the systematic increase in slopes
with increasingD. The asymmetric effect of intensity difference
Figure 2. Initially brightest target was preferred despite balanced target durations. Shown
is theprobability of rightward saccades as a functionof the (initial) intensity differencebetween
the right and left target in Experiment 1. A, The 160 ms control trials. B, The 80-80 ms reversal
trials. C, The 80 ms control trials. D, The 40-40 ms reversal trials. Each data point consists of 60
trials. Solid lines show psychometric functions fitted to the data. Colors identify the different
subjects. Insets illustrate the intensities of the two targets over the course of a trial. The positive
slopes of the psychometric curves indicate a consistent preference for the initially strongest
target (compared with the ambiguous control condition). Negative slopes would have been
obtained if there had been a preference for the target that had the highest final intensity.
Horizontal lines would have been obtained if there had been no preference (other than a con-
stant bias).
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inD1 versusD2 is reflected in the fact that the trend line does not
pass through the origin.
Because Experiment 2 kept the total duration constant, one
cannot conclude that D is the only or even the mechanistically
relevant variable controlling the choice process. Indeed, strong
hysteresis is only expected if D1 exceeds the (probably subject-
dependent) feedback time constant. To test this, Experiment 3
used the smallest practical D1 (40 ms) and varied D2 among 40,
80, and 120 ms to quantify the potential breakdown of the pri-
macy that we found at larger D1. Figure 3F, G illustrates the
behavior of two different subjects in this experiment. Note that
their choices were consistently influenced by D2, with a clear
breakdown of primacy at D2 80 ms in one of them (Fig. 3G).
This behavior is quantified in Figure 3H for all four subjects. Note
the systematic decrease in slope of the psychometric curves with
increasing D2: the longer the D2, the weaker the preference for the
initially most intense target. For two subjects, the sign of the slopes
even flipped frompositive tonegative ifD2 exceededD1, indicating a
preference for the target with the highest final intensity.
Thus, a brief (40-80 ms) initial bias consistently dominated
the responses ifD1 lasted an equal amount of time or longer than
D2. However, stimulus information in D2 was not simply ig-
nored. In Experiment 2, the longer thatD2 exceededD1, themore
often subjects responded to the target with the highest final in-
tensity and, for the shortD1 durations in Experiment 3, some but
not all subjects showed a transition from primacy to recency.
Figure 3. Choice behavior under unbalanced duration conditions. Experiment 2 (A–E) varied D1 and D2, keeping D1 D2 constant at 160 ms. A, The 160 ms control condition. B, The 80-80 ms
reversal condition. C, The 120-40ms reversal condition. D, The 40-120ms reversal condition. E, Slopes of the psychometric curves for the three different reversal conditions and the 160ms control
condition as a function ofD (i.e., D1 D2), averaged over subjects. Experiment 3 (F–H ) varied D2, keeping D1 constant at 40 ms. F, G, Psychometric response functions of subjects J.K. and D.A.,
respectively. Black, open circles indicate control data thatwere pooled over the three target durations (80, 120, and 160ms) because stimulus durations in control trials had no significant influence.
Dark gray, circles indicate the 40-40ms reversal condition.Middle gray, squares indicate the 40-80ms reversal condition. Light gray triangles indicate the 40-120ms reversal condition.H, Slopes of
the psychometric curves fitted to the three reversal conditions as a function of D. Values of D2 are indicated below the horizontal axes for convenience. Positive (negative) slope indicates a
preference for the initial (final) brightest target. Colors represent different subjects; error bars denote SEs of the slopes. Note breakdown of the primacy effect if long D2 ( 80 ms) epochs were
preceded by a short (40 ms) D1 epoch.
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Strong target imbalance
As noted in the Introduction, observing primacy does not neces-
sarily imply that the dynamics of evidence accumulation pro-
duces hysteresis. In fact, any decision process that can commit to
a particular choice before the stimulus ends can produce primacy
independently of its dynamic properties (Fig. 1C). The capability
for such premature commitment is common to a wide range of
decision models, which share the crucial assumption of becom-
ing committed to a particular choice as soon as the evidence
(accumulated via some model-dependent process) for that par-
ticular alternative hits a fixed bound or threshold. However, the
crucial distinction is that dynamic hysteresis due to feedback
cross-inhibition creates primacy without irreversible commit-
ment: sufficiently strong input should be able to “override” hys-
teresis, even when such input arrives well after the internal
dynamics has settled into one of its hysteretic states.We therefore
decided to present equal-duration reversal stimuli across an ex-
tended range of target imbalances. This yields two clearly differ-
ent predictions for models with or without strong feedback
competition. In the absence of feedback competition or if the
feedback is not strong enough to create hysteresis, primacy due to
absorbing bounds should increase systematically with target im-
balance, so the psychometric curves should increase monotoni-
cally from saturation at p 0 to saturation at p 1. Primacy due
to strong feedback competition, however, should produce non-
monotonic curves because primacy will eventually decrease if the
target imbalance becomes sufficiently large. This prediction
holds because the input duringD2 will start to exceed the strength
of the hysteresis induced during D1, and the absence of commit-
ment (absorbing boundaries) will allow the decision process to
evolve for at least the full duration of the stimulus. Some of the
psychometric curves from Experiments 1–3 may already hint to-
ward such nonmonotonic choice behavior, but testing this pre-
diction over a wider range of target imbalances is clearly called
for. For this purpose, we switched to a different projector capable
of producing higher contrasts and luminances (seeMaterials and
Methods).
Figure 4 shows the results from all six subjects who partici-
pated in this fourth experiment. Dashed curves are the psycho-
metric curve fitted to the control data (Equation 1, circles). For
these brief, 50 ms stimuli, all subjects correctly chose the most
intense target in the condition with the highest intensity and
correct responses decreased to50% for very small contrast. In
the 50-50 ms reversal condition (Equation 1, squares), subjects
showed a consistent primacy effect that increased with target
imbalance up to 40 cd/m2. This regime corresponds to the
behavior measured in the 40-40 ms reversal conditions of Exper-
iments 1 and 3. At higher intensity biases, however, the choice
probabilities clearly showed a reversed trend, in that the primacy
effect started to decline. To determine whether this decline was
statistically significant, we first compared the probabilities of the
outmost two points on either side of the curve. We found a sig-
nificant (Fischer’s exact test, p  0.05) decrease in primacy on
one side of the range of target contrasts for all subjects except J.G.
and a significant decrease on both sides for subject J.E. To further
quantify the strength of this trend reversal, we fitted a minimally
extended generalized psychometric function model to the entire
dataset (Equation 2, solid lines; see Materials and Methods). For
all subjects, the coefficient of the third-order polynomial term
was significantly negative (mean 	 SD across subjects: c 
(2.73 	 0.72)  106; t test, p  0.05, for all individual sub-
jects), indicating that the data indeed showed a significant decline
of the basic primacy effect at higher target contrasts. These tests
thus demonstrate that the observed primacy effects cannot be
attributed purely to early choice commitment because, without
sufficiently strong feedback competition, the latter would predict
a monotonic increase in primacy.
Forced reversal
Although the basic primacy effect could indeed be reduced by
stronger target contrasts (approximately for I 
 40 cd/m2),
these findings could not provide a strict upper limit on the pos-
sible contribution of premature choice commitment or a strict
lower limit on the contribution of dynamic hysteresis. To obtain
those limits, we investigated to what extent the primacy effect
breaks downwhen later-arriving stimulus evidence in favor of the
opposite target location is very strong. Experiment 4 therefore
included “forced reversal” trials in which D2 was immediately
followed by a D3 epoch in which the reversed target imbalance
was made even stronger than the reversed imbalance during D2.
As explained in the Materials and Methods and illustrated in
Figure 5A, any residual probability of choosing the initially
Figure 4. Breakdown of primacy by strong target imbalance and late forcing pulses. Proba-
bility of rightward saccades (	SEM) as a function of the (initial) intensity difference between
the left and the right target in Experiment 4. Each panel shows the results from one subject.
Circles and dotted lines indicate the 50 ms control condition with a fitted psychometric curve
(Equation 1). Squares and solid lines indicate the 50-50ms reversal trials (n 100 for eachI )
with fitted curves following Equation 2. Note the nonmonotonic nature of these psychometric
response functions. Arrows indicate a significant decrease in the primacy effect (Fischer’s exact
test,p0.05). Forced reversal stimuli inducedanear-complete inversionof theprimacy effect.
Diamonds indicate the 50-50-67 ms forced reversal condition. Triangles indicate the 83-67
forced reversal condition.
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brightest target in this forced reversal condition then sets an up-
per limit on how much of the primacy seen without the forcing
D3 phase is caused by premature choice commitment. Con-
versely, the amount of primacy in the unforced condition that
can be attributed to hysteresis is at least as large as the reduction
in primacy that occurs when appending the forcing D3 phase to
the stimulus.
For efficiency, and to ensure that forced reversal trials were
relatively rare occurrences in any given block of trials (17%), we
only used a target contrast that produced a strong primacy effect,
as measured in pilot experiments. The duration of the forcingD3
phase was set at 67 ms. Note that if D3 were too short to reach
maximal choice forcing, it would merely reduce the test’s power
to reject the hypothesis of absorbing bounds being responsible
for primacy effects. As shown in Figure 4 (isolated diamonds near
p  0 and p  1), adding the D3 forcing phase to the stimulus
completely abolished primacy and drove all subjects to choose
almost exclusively the target with final dominance. The same
result was obtained with the 83-67 ms forcing condition (Fig. 4,
triangles; see Materials and Methods). These findings strongly
suggest that the contribution of premature choice commitment
was extremely small.
As outlined in the Materials and Methods, the simplest ap-
proach to quantifying how strong these data challenge mecha-
nisms that attribute primacy effects to premature commitment is
to focus on a slightlymore specific class ofmodels with absorbing
bounds, namely those without hysteresis in their evidence accu-
mulation. This restriction still includes all “standard” decision
models, such as “bounded drift-diffusion” (Gold and Shadlen,
2007). All models that we are aware of that use bounded integra-
tion, leaky or not, and independently of theirmutual interactions
as long as they are tooweak to cause hysteresis. This whole class of
models can then be tested quantitatively by comparing the prob-
ability Fi of still choosing the initially strongest target in forced
reversal conditions with the probability Ri, of choosing the ini-
tially strongest target in the corresponding unforced reversal con-
ditions. More specifically, we could test whether the measured Ri
and Fi combinations violate the inequality (see Materials and
Methods for details): Fi 2 Ri 1. If so, our data would provide
strong evidence against the verywide class ofmodelswith absorb-
ing bounds and no hysteresis. One can in fact derive less conser-
vative inequalities for the Ri, Fi combinations when focusing on
specific models within this highly diverse class, but this is beyond
the scope of the present paper and proved unnecessary for our
present purposes.
To visualize the inequality test, we plotted the averaged Ri and
Fi data pairs from each subject (seeMaterials andMethods) in the
scatter plot in Figure 5 (error bars indicate 	1 SEM). Note that
the data points would have to fall within the gray area delineated
by the line Fi  2 Ri  1 to satisfy the predictions of absorbing
bound models without hysteresis. It is quite clear, however, that
nearly all data from the 50-50-67 ms forcing condition fell well
outside of that region (Fig. 5B). A one-sided z test on each data
pair (see Materials and Methods) indeed showed a highly sig-
nificant violation of inequality 4 (p 0.00015) for all but one
of our subjects. When we performed the test with the Fi’s
derived from the 83-67 ms forcing condition (Fig. 5C), we also
found highly significant violations of inequality 4 (p 
0.00005), except for subject J.E. As can be seen in Figure 4, the
lack of statistical significance for J.E. in these tests stems from
a single Ri outlier data point. If we would have based the test
for this subject on his full dataset (i.e., sampling from the
fit-function based on all data points), this test too would have
strongly violated inequality 4.
Model simulations
The choice data from Experiment 4 provide strong evidence
against the broad class of accumulator models with absorbing
Figure 5. Breakdown of primacy under forced reversal conditions excludes absorbing-boundmodels. A, Evidence trajectories in the bounded drift diffusion model (Gold and Shadlen, 2007) for
the reversal stimuli applied in Experiment 4. The bounded drift diffusionmodel is an example of amuch broader class of decision-makingmodels that all share the common property that the choice
for a particular alternative becomes irreversible once the accumulated evidence for that alternative reaches its critical bound (here at either E 1 or E1). Three variables are defined:Ai, Ri, and
Fi. Ai is the fraction of trajectories that—according to the model—hit the bound for the initially strongest target in the red-labeled time window. Ri is the observed probability of choosing the
initially strongest target in the (unforced) reversal condition. Ri equals the sumofAi and the fraction of trajectories that crossed the vertical blue line segment. Fi is the probability of still choosing the
initially strongest target in the forced reversal condition. Fi equals the sum of Ai and the fraction of trajectories that hit or crossed the green line segments. Only those trajectories that did not yet hit
a bound by the end of D2 (i.e., the “surviving” trajectories) can still be influenced by the D3 forcing stimulus. Fi thus sets the upper limit for Ai. Together with the antisymmetric nature of the reversal
stimulus, this leads to theprediction that, for absorbingboundmodels, the inequality Fi2Ri1must hold (Equation4,Materials andMethods).B,C, Choiceprobabilities for the initially strongest
target in the 50-50-67ms (B) and the 83-67ms (C) forced reversal conditions (Fi) as a function of the probability of making that same choice in the 50-50ms (unforced) reversal condition (Ri). Only
thegray area,which satisfies the inequality Fi2Ri1 (Equation 4,Materials andMethods), canbe reachedby absorbingboundmodels. Colored symbols showmeandata points per subject,with
an initial bias of 7.2 versus 49.5 cd/m 2 (filled symbols) or 13.7 versus 40.0 cd/m 2 (J.K., blue open symbol) and 3.6 versus 62.7 cd/m 2 (J.G., cyan open symbol). Error bars indicate	1 SEM (see
Materials and Methods).
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bounds. Here, we simulated feedforward and feedback competi-
tion models without absorbing bounds and tested their perfor-
mance against our observations. Figure 6 shows a schematic
drawing of the feedforward (Fig. 6A) and feedback (Fig. 6B) ar-
chitectures. The inputs, representing the intensities of the two
targets, pass through a leaky-integrator and nonlinear compres-
sion stage. Decisions are based on the units’ activity levels at
target offset. The two models differ only in the type of cross-
inhibition that mediates the competition. In the feedforward
model, each decision unit receives cross-inhibition from the op-
posing input, whereas in the feedback model, each unit receives
cross-inhibition from the output of the alternate decision unit. To
show the effect of changes in stimulus intensity, we simulated
reversal trials. For the feedback circuit, the nature of the response
(degree of hysteresis) depends crucially on how D1 relates to the
time constant of the overall feedback dynamics. For our first
demonstration (Fig. 6B), we simulated the 80-80ms reversal con-
dition. The time constant of the decision units was chosen as just
sufficient to allow the network to settle on a choice determined by
the initially strongest target before the beginning ofD2 (i.e., Ti
80 ms). This prevents the decision unit of the initially weaker
target from responding significantly despite the fact that the tar-
get intensities have reversed (Fig. 6B, insets). Conversely, the
output of the feedforward model more or less follows the se-
quence of input events (Fig. 6A, insets). Figure 6C illustrates how
the behavior of the feedback model changes if D1 is shorter than
the feedback time constant. Increasing D2 then results in a tran-
sition from a preference for the initial brightest target if D2 is
short (top row) to a preference for the most intense target at the
end if D2 becomes large (bottom rows).
Figure 7 shows the choice behavior of the two models (same
format as Figs. 2, 3). Five different conditions were simulated.
The first three panels in each row show simulations of the reversal
conditions from Experiment 2 (from left to right, 40-120 ms,
80-80 ms and 120-40 ms, respectively). The fourth panel shows
the 40-40 ms reversal condition from Experiment 1. The last
panel on the right shows the 50-50ms reversal condition that was
tested over a larger contrast range in Experiment 4. The two
curves in each graph show the results obtained with two different
parameter sets, representing two subjects that showed distinctly
different choice behavior in the 40-120 ms reversal condition of
Experiment 2 (gray: D.A.-like subject; black: J.K.-like subject).
The feedback model (Fig. 7A) generally prefers the initially
most intense target. However, in the 40-120 ms reversal condi-
tion (Fig. 7A, left), the presence of hysteresis depends critically on
the integration constant (Ti) and the cross-inhibition strength
(	). With a longer Ti and a weaker 	, the hysteresis disappears
(note that the absolute values of Ti should not be taken literally
because they scale with the shape parameter c of the sigmoid
function). For high target contrasts (Fig. 7A, right), the model
Figure 6. Model properties. A, B, Diagram of the feedforward (A) and feedback (B) cross-inhibition model together with simulations of the 80-80 ms reversal condition from our experiments.
Arrowheadsdenoteexcitation, bulletheads inhibition. Inputs represent the intensities of the left (L, green) and the right (R, red) target as a functionof time. The inputspass througha leaky integrator
and a nonlinear Naka-Rushton compression stage (s x 2/(x 2 c) for x
 0, otherwise s 0; c 1). The difference between the twomodels is in the type of cross-inhibition only. Choices were
assigned by comparing the units’ responsemagnitude at stimulus offset. An additional integration step (shown transparently) in the feedforwardmodel can—for this reversal condition—“repair”
its failure to produce primacywithout absorbing bounds. C, Output of the left (green) and right (red) decision units from the feedbackmodel as a function of time for leftward and rightward choices
(columns) in the three different (D1, D2) timing conditions of Experiment 3 (rows). Model parameters for the simulations in A–C, Integration constant Ti 80 ms; strength of the cross-inhibition,
	 3.33 for feedback cross-inhibition,
 1.0 for feedforward cross-inhibition; Variance of the Gaussian white noise on the inputs was 20% of the mean.
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shows the observed decline of the primacy effect as such strong
stimuli are able to “override” the hysteresis. Response biases as
observed in the experiments could be induced, for example, by
asymmetries in input gains for the left and right decision units
(data not shown).
For the feedforward model, a direct readout of the competi-
tion stage at stimulus offset (Fig. 7B) always predicts a preference
for the target that is most intense at the end. Note, however, that
this failure to replicate the basic primacy effect can be “repaired”
by adding an accumulator stage that integrates the output of the
competition stage without any further interactions or absorbing
bounds (Fig. 6A). Indeed, when the choices are based on the total
time integral of its competition stage output (Fig. 7C), primacy
occurs when the two stimulus epochs are equal or the first epoch
is longer. Nevertheless, with this augmented version of the feed-
forward model, it remains impossible to produce primacy in the
40-120 ms reversal condition (as seen in some of our subjects in
Experiments 2 and 3). This is due to the absence of absorbing
bounds and absence of hysteresis in the evidence accumulation.
Both versions of the feedforward model also fail to account for
the observed decline in primacy at large target contrasts (Exper-
iment 4) regardless of its parameter settings. Thus, in short, nei-
ther the competition stage nor the added accumulator stage of the
feedforward model were able to fully capture all key features of
the saccadic choice behavior that were revealed across our differ-
ent reversal conditions.
Reaction time
The choice patterns in Experiments 2 and 3 showed remarkably
different dependencies on the same stimulus set between our
subjects. This offers a unique opportunity to investigate whether
reaction times for the alternatives follow similarly different pat-
terns in the same subjects or if they are dissociated from choice
probabilities altogether. We wondered, for example, if the rela-
tion between reaction time and choice probability followed some
simple constraints such as: (1) the mean latencies of saccades
toward the most frequently chosen target are systematically
shorter than themean latencies of saccades toward the competing
target, and (2) increases in choice preference are associated with
increases in this latency difference.
The data from Experiments 1–3 showed, however, that there
was no significant correlation between choice preference and
Figure 7. Model simulations of the different reversal conditions. A, Choice behavior of the feedback model. B, C, Choice behavior of the feedforwardmodel in the competition stage (B) and the
accumulator stage (C) presented in the same format. Each panel shows the probability of choosing the right target as a function of rightward bias at stimulus onset (I, here in arbitrary units) for
different timing conditions, as indicated in the top right corner. Note the larger range ofI values on the abscissa of the rightmost panels, corresponding to the larger contrast-range thatwas tested
in Experiment4. Black andgray symbols represent simulation results obtainedwith twodifferent sets of parameters. Values in each setwere chosen toeithermimic thebehavior of subjectD.A. (gray)
or subject J.K. (black), because these two subjects clearly showed opposite choice behavior in the 40-120ms reversal condition of Experiments 2 and 3. Model parameters were obtained bymanual
adjustment: Ti 50 ms and Ti 25 ms (gray and black curves, respectively);	 3.25 and	 7.00 for feedback cross-inhibition (gray and black curves, respectively),
 1 for feedforward
cross-inhibition; Variance of the Gaussian white noise on the inputs was 60% of the mean. Each data point consists of 500 simulated trials.
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mean latency difference of leftward versus
rightward saccades in the control condi-
tions (Fig. 8A; r  0.11, t test, p  0.28
over all subjects and conditions). For
most data from the reversal conditions
(Fig. 8B), we did find a significant corre-
lation between choice preference and la-
tency difference (r  0.65, t test, p 
0.0001), but only for timing conditions
that produced a preference for the initially
brightest target (Fig. 8B, small symbols,
thin regression line). For timing condi-
tions that produced a preference for the
target with the highest final intensity (i.e.,
negative slopes of psychometric curves,
20% of the data), we actually found an
opposite relationship between latency and
choice. Under these latter conditions (Fig.
8B, large symbols, thick regression line),
the mean latencies of rightward saccades
increased significantly compared with the
mean latencies of leftward saccades as the
preference for the right target increased
and vice versa if preference for the left tar-
get increased (r  0.68, t test, p 
0.0001).
This remarkable dissociation between
choice probability and saccade latency is
further illustrated in Figure 8C–E for the
four subjects that showed nearly inverted
choice preferences in the 80-80ms (black)
versus 40-120 ms (gray) reversal condi-
tions in Experiment 2 (Fig. 3B,D). Note
that for each saccade direction, the
changes in reaction time as a function of
initial target contrast were the same under
both timing conditions (Fig. 8D,E; ANCOVA, F 0.24, p
 0.8
and F  1.88, p 
 0.1, respectively), whereas the changes in
choice probability were opposite (Fig. 8C, t test, p 0.0001). This
shows that the reaction times depended strongly on the initial
target contrast and on the direction of the ensuing saccade, but
not on the probability of choosing either target. Saccade latency
was short compared with the ambiguous control condition if the
initially stronger target was chosen (i.e.,RT 0) but long if the
initially weaker target was chosen (i.e., RT 
 0), and these la-
tency differences increased as a function of the initial intensity
difference regardless of the choice probability.
This relation between reaction time and the initial intensity of
the selected target (or its initial intensity difference with the other
target) was found across all experiments and all conditions (Fig.
9). In Experiments 1–3, the chronometric response functions
obtained in reversal conditions (Fig. 9B) were actually quite sim-
ilar to the ones obtained in control conditions (Fig. 9A). This is
quantified in Figure 9C for all test conditions applied in Experi-
ment 1 using the slopes of the chronometric response functions
(see Materials and Methods, above; Eq. 8). Because the chrono-
metric functions for rightward and leftward saccades were prac-
tically mirror images, we pooled these responses by inverting the
slope of the rightward responses. Neither the 80-80 ms nor the
40-40 ms reversal condition produced significantly different la-
tency effects compared with the control conditions (ANCOVA,
F  1.18, p 
 0.2 and F  0.5, p 
 0.4, respectively). Similar
results were obtained in Experiments 2 and 3 (Fig. 9D,E, respec-
tively). In both experiments, changes inD1 andD2 had very little
influence on the saccade latencies. This contrasts markedly with
the robust influences on choice behavior (Fig. 3). In fact, the
chronometric functions remained invariant to both the pres-
ence and timing of the reversals (ANCOVA: no significant
differences in Experiment 2, F 0.28, p
 0.8 and Experiment
3, F  1.25, p 
 0.2). This similarity between control and
reversal data in Experiments 1–3 shows that a revision of the
initial decision by later evidence did not lead to an extra delay
in saccade reaction time. In fact, in Experiment 4, when we
forced saccades in the opposite direction of the initially stron-
gest target, thus breaking down the hysteresis built up during
the initial part of the stimulus, the latencies were somewhat
shorter than the ones in the corresponding unforced condition
(mean 	 SEM latency difference for movements to the same
location: 26 	 4 ms, paired t test, p  0.0001; and for move-
ments to the opposite location: 17 	 5 ms, p  0.01; data not
shown). This latency reduction by late stimulus evidence also
refutes the notion that initial information alone might have
been the determining factor in reaction times. The latter is
further corroborated by the significant differences in slopes of
the chronometric function for the control versus reversal con-
ditions obtained in Experiment 4 (Fig. 9F; ANCOVA: F 
47.53, p  0.0001), for which the mean target intensity levels
were larger than in Experiments 1–3 (i.e., 27.8 cd/m2 vs 16.7
cd/m2, respectively; see Materials and Methods).
Figure 8. Decoupling of choice probability and reaction times. A, Mean latency difference between rightward and
leftward saccades as a function of choice preference pooled across all control conditions of Experiments 1–3. B, Data from
reversal conditions in the same experiments separated into two categories based on the slopes of the psychometric curves
as shown in Figures 2 and 3. Small symbols, thin line: slopes
 0, indicating a preference for the initially brightest target.
Large symbols, thick line: slopes 0, indicating a preference for the target that is brightest at the end. Colors represent
different subjects. C–E, Psychometric (C) and chronometric (D, E, rightward and leftward saccades, respectively) response
functions obtained in Experiment 2 averaged over the four subjects whose choice behavior reversed between the 80-80 ms
(black) and 40-120 ms (gray) test conditions. Error bars show the mean 	 1 SEM over subjects. For each subject, the
average reaction time measured in the ambiguous condition was subtracted before averaging to correct for large inter-
subject variation in average reaction time.
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Discussion
We studied saccadic decision making using two simultaneously
(160ms) presented targets with intensity reversals occurring at
different moments in time. Using this novel approach, we found
a robust primacy effect: subjects always preferred the target that
was brightest during the early part of each stimulus even if longer-
lasting, opposite differenceswere present in the secondpart of the
stimulus. This primacy effect collapsed when: (1) the duration of
the early stimulus phase was reduced to 40 ms, (2) the target
intensity differences were large, or (3) the reversal stimulus was
followed by a strong stimulus bias toward the initially weakest
target. The latter two findings show that the basic primacy effect
did not result from premature commitment to the initially domi-
nant target. A decision model that assumes feedback cross-
inhibition, however, fully described the observed choice behavior.
There is some prior evidence that decision making is biased
toward early visual information. In amotion discrimination task,
Ludwig et al. (2005) found that subjects rely mostly on informa-
tion provided in the beginning, a finding that they later explained
with a time-varying decision threshold (Ludwig, 2009). Dis-
turbing motion pulses also have more effect when they occur
early in a trial (Huk and Shadlen, 2005; Kiani et al., 2008; Tsetsos
et al., 2012). Furthermore, using a search task in which target
intensities jittered, Tsetsos et al. (2011) found a preference for the
initially strongest target and concluded
that this could be due to feedback
competition.
One might argue that feedforward
models do predict primacy if subjects ad-
opted a low decision threshold reached
shortly after stimulus onset (Ludwig,
2009) or if the integration of evidence
were bounded (Kiani et al., 2008). How-
ever, our finding that the primacy effect
decreases at higher target contrasts (Fig. 4)
cannot be explained by any feedforward
model with irreversible decision thresh-
olds. Moreover, the very low probabilities
of still choosing the initially strongest tar-
get in the forced reversal condition (Fig.
5) show that even for feedback models
that do allow dynamic hysteresis, absorb-
ing bounds play no significant role in con-
trolling the well defined saccadic choice
behavior that occurred in Experiment 4.
These robust findings are corroborated by
some of the results obtained by Tsetsos et
al. (2012), who found that motion-
direction discrimination in one of their
subjects showed a primacy-to-recency
transition for short- versus long-duration
stimuli. Given the evidence against choice
commitment,dominanceof the initial stim-
ulus also contradicts many other model
types: high-leakage models (Kiani et al.,
2008) and most “urgency” models (Dit-
terich, 2006; Cisek et al., 2009) give more
weight to the final stimulus (unless the ur-
gency signal rose faster than our 40 ms
minimal duration; Standage et al., 2011).
Likewise, recent gating models (Purcell et
al., 2010; Schall et al., 2011) prevent accu-
mulation of the initial, low-amplitude
part of the sensory input.
In theory, it is possible that a different mechanism triggered a
saccade to the bright forcing target even though the original
mechanism had already committed to the other target. In partic-
ular, one might worry that, due to subsiding fixation activity, the
late forcing pulses were able to elicit so-called express saccades
(Dorris et al., 1997; Bell et al., 2006). There was, however, no
evidence for this; the latencies of individual saccades were always

150ms relative to the onset of the forcing pulse, which rules out
any specific involvement of the express pathways. We also exam-
ined the actual eye movement traces. Prior commitment to the
initially strongest target in a parallel pathway would predict that
saccades toward the forcing target are substantially influenced by
(preparatory) activity related to the other impending saccade.
However, as shown in Figure 10, the metrics and kinematics of
saccades in the forced condition were actually very similar to
those in the control and unforced condition. This supports our
assumption that they resulted from the same saccademechanism.
Interestingly, we found that reaction times depended on the
initial stimulus contrast and on the direction of the ensuing sac-
cade (Fig. 9), but not on the probability of choosing either target
(Fig. 8). In fact, bymanipulating the timing of the intensity swaps
in Experiments 2 and 3, we could nearly invert the relation be-
tween reaction time and choice probability from faster to slower
Figure 9. Reaction time as a function of initial intensity of the selected target. A,B, Average reaction times relative to stimulus
onset as a function of the initial rightward bias in the 160 ms control condition (A) and the 80-80 ms reversal condition (B) of
Experiment 1. Averages (	1 SEM) were calculated from a minimum of six responses per intensity condition (i.e., for choice
probabilities, p 0.1). For each subject, the average reaction time measured in the ambiguous condition was subtracted before
averaging to correct for large intersubject variation in average reaction time and the results were shown separately for saccades to
the right (top) and the left (bottom) target. As a result, offsets of the regression lines (gray)were practically zero. Colored lines and
symbols are results from individual subjects. Thick regression lines (gray) are based on the pooled data from all subjects. Average
reaction times (	SD) in the ambiguous condition for the different subjects ranged between 395	 15ms and 573	 11ms. C–F,
Slopes of the chronometric functions (i.e., gray lines in A,B) for the different experimental conditions of Experiments 1–4,
respectively. Colored symbols represent slopes from individual subjects. To allow for pooling of the data from leftward (open
symbols) and rightward saccades (filled symbols), slopes obtained for rightward responses were multiplied by1. The resulting
slopes were typically positive, indicating that reaction times decreasedwith increasing initial intensity of the selected target. Bars
with error bars show the mean	 1 SEM across subjects.
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reactions for the more likely outcome in some of our subjects.
Such a remarkable dissociation between reaction time and choice
behavior has, to our knowledge, never been reported. Instead, it is
typically found that changes in choice probability go hand in
hand with opposite changes in reaction time (Palmer et al., 2005;
Chittka et al., 2009, but see Niwa and Ditterich, 2008, who found
another example of a dissociation: reaction times that varied
across conditions without changes in choice probability and vice
versa). Current decision-making theories explain these findings
from the first-to-threshold principle, but this principle cannot
account for the choice behaviors observed in Experiment 4 (Figs.
4, 5), the decoupling of choices and reaction times (Fig. 8), and
the remarkable invariance of the chronometric functions to both
the presence and timing of the reversals observed in Experiments
1–3 (Fig. 9A–E). We thus conclude that reaction time and choice
are determined by separate mechanism rather than by a single-
stage competition process. This fits in previous conceptual
schemes (Findlay andWalker, 1999), which propose that “when”
and “where” are determined by parallel but hierarchically orga-
nized pathways.
Physiological studies clearly support the notion that target
selection and movement initiation are distinct phenomena. In
monkeys performing visual search, visually responsive cells in
frontal eye fields, lateral intraparietal sulcus, and superior collicu-
lus discriminate between target and distracters (frontal eye field:
Schall and Hanes, 1993; lateral intraparietal sulcus: Schall and
Hanes, 1993; Ipata et al., 2006; Thomas and Pare´, 2007; superior
colliculus: Basso andWurtz, 1997;McPeek and Keller, 2002), but
the latency with which these cells discriminate the target from
distractors is unrelated to the timing of the ensuingmovement. In
fact, the selection takes place independently of movement execu-
tion (Schall et al., 1995; Thompson et al., 1996; Thompson et al.,
1997; Murthy et al., 2001; Sato and Schall, 2003; Juan et al., 2004;
Murthy et al., 2009).
The chronometric functions from all of our experiments in-
dicated that reaction times decreased systematically with increas-
ing initial intensity of the selected target (Figs. 8, 9). One might
speculate, therefore, that the reaction times might have been de-
termined by the target contrasts at stimulus onset. Such a theory
would be consistent, for example, with the contrast-dependent
spike timing recently observed in primary visual cortex (Lee et al.,
2010) and is further supported by Experiments 1–3, which
showed that neither the presence nor the timing of the intensity
reversals had a significant influence on the chronometric re-
sponse curves (Fig. 9C–E), However, in Experiment 4, we found
that the chronometric functions for the control and reversal con-
ditions were clearly different (Fig. 9F) and that the later forcing
stimulus actually shortened the saccade latencies, indicating that
later stimulus information did affect the reaction times. A possi-
ble interpretation of these effects is that increases in stimulus
intensity decrease the delays in visual processing (Bell et al.,
2006).
The present literature leaves some uncertainty about how the
target-selection stage is read out. In our simulations, we tested
two different approaches. Either the integrated output of the de-
cision units was compared, choosing the channel with the highest
value as the current winner, or the output levels of the decision
units at stimulus offset were compared. The latter could rely, for
example, on the activity levels of cells that keep the latest choice in
working memory (Kojima and Goldman-Rakic, 1982; Chafee
and Goldman-Rakic, 1998). For the feedforward model, the type
of readout heavily influenced its choice behavior, but due to the
absence of hysteresis in the evidence accumulation, neither type
could be reconciled with the experimental data (Fig. 7B,C). For
the feedback model, only a readout at stimulus offset produced
predictions that were qualitatively consistent with the observed
behavior (Fig. 7A). Results from the integrated output (data not
shown) failed to account for the nonmonotonic nature of the
psychometric curves in the 50-50 ms reversal conditions of
Experiment 4.
Bollimunta and Ditterich (2012) obtained physiological evi-
dence frommonkey lateral intraparietal sulcus for the presence of
a feedforward inhibition component in the random-dotmotion-
direction discrimination task. At the same time, the presence of
feedback inhibition could not be ruled out. Here, we did not
simulate hybrid models. It is possible, and perhaps even likely,
that feedforward inhibition also contributes to the visual target-
selection process that we have studied here. However, having
ruled out a significant contribution of premature choice commit-
ment in Experiment 4, the essence of our findings is that the
observed primacy effects can only be accounted for by a model
that includes sufficiently strong feedback cross-inhibition.
We conclude that saccadic responses to competing visual tar-
gets are best described by a model featuring a competitive choice
mechanism based on feedback cross-inhibition that exerts exec-
utive control (possibly mediated by the substantia nigra; Hiko-
saka and Wurtz, 1983) over the initiation of upcoming saccades.
Figure 10. Saccade trajectories. Position and velocity traces of all saccades to the left target
in the control (A), reversal (B), and forced reversal (C) condition made by two naive subjects
(D.A. and J.W.) in Experiment 4 (black). Averaged traces are superimposed (gray). Both the
metrics and kinematics of the saccades were comparable. This supports our assumption that
they resulted from the same saccade mechanism.
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